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In this essay, I describe some of the beneﬁts of cognitive diversity in a complex world as well as the origins of that diversity. The
essay has two main parts sandwiched between a brief description of what I mean by diversity and complexity, as well as a brief
discussion of whether social systems produce sufﬁcient diversity. In the ﬁrst part, I describe models that provide insight into why
we see the levels of diversity that we do. These models rest on social psychological foundations but borrow ideas from economics
as well as population genetics. In the second part, I describe the functional beneﬁts of diversity. I show how diverse predictive
models can make a collection of people better able to make accurate predictions, how diverse perspectives and heuristics can
enable groups of problem solvers to ﬁnd innovative new solutions to problems, and how diverse behaviors and representations




CopI don’t like work,—no man does—but I like what is in
the work—the chance to ﬁnd yourself. Your own real-
ity—for yourself, not for others—what no other man
can ever know. They can only see the real show and
never tell what it really means.—Joseph Conrad, The Heart of Darkness
Two questions animate the research that I will describe in this
essay: why do people differ in their behaviors and mental
models to the extent that they do and how do these differences
matter? Does diversity merely create problems, leading to
conﬂict and a lack of trust, or do our differences make us
collectively more innovative and more creative, better able to
solve difﬁcult problems and make sense of our complex
world? Do they make our societies more resilient? These are
large and messy questions, so the contributions that I make
will necessarily be modest both in scope and in depth.
Clearly, the functional implications of diversity cut both ways.
Whether one looks at the level of communities or nations, one
ﬁnds that trust (Putnam, 2007), contributions to public goods,
and measures of social capital often decline with identity
heterogeneity.1 Looking across countries, one ﬁnds that
cultural diversity increases the likelihood of conﬂict, but eco-
nomic diversity promotes trade. If one looks within a country,
one can see evidence of tension, criminal behavior, and lower
levels of funding for public goods. These all result from iden-
tity diversity. At the same time, however, as Alberto Alesina
and Eliana La Ferrara (2005) note, the most culturally diverse
cities, here they consider New York and Los Angeles, but onerrespondence to: Scott E. Page, Center for the Study of Complex Systems, 3
ail: spage@umich.edu
Aligica (2014) Chapter 1 for an excellent, brief summary.
er models posit that productivity is single peaked in diversity—see Ashraf a
yright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.could also mention London, Paris, or Hong Kong, are also
“constant producers of innovation in the arts and business.”
Further, when one separates birthplace diversity from ethno
linguistic diversity, the former positively correlates with
aggregate economic productivity at the city level (Alesina,
Harnoss, & Rapoport, 2013). Overall then, the evidence would
seem to suggest that differences in backgrounds help the
economy, provided that people can just get along.2
Evidence and theory also demonstrate that cognitive diversity
improves problem solving and prediction abilities for small
groups (Page, 2007). This raises the possibility that political
systems in diverse countries could be higher functioning than
in homogeneous societies, but this requires knowledge of how
to leverage that diversity (Laitin & Jeon, 2013; Landemore,
2013). This way of thinking presents diversity as a part of the
solution as opposed to the underlying cause of political problems
(Huckfeldt et al., 2004). To wit, the opening sentence of Jim John-
son and Jack Knight’s (2011) The Priority of Democracy reads,
“Politics, in large part, is a response to diversity.” I accept that dif-
ferences in preferences and identities underlie the splitting up
of so many pies, but I claim too that cognitive diversity can
enlarge the pies before they are allocated.
Let me turn brieﬂy to the proposition that people differ. Stated
as such, the claim is indisputable but lacks scholarly focus.
One must choose a set of dimensions on which to identify
differences and a set of mechanisms that cause them. We differ
in our preferences and interests, in our beliefs, in how we
perceive and categorize the world around us, and in the
heuristics and tools we possess to solve problems. We also differ
in our personalities, our cultural traits, and our physical21 West Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48104A.
nd Galor (2013).
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268 Scott E. Pagecharacteristics. And, as Conrad so aptly observes, apart from our
physical traits, these differences remain largely opaque to
others. Whether contemplating a book, a political campaign,
a Federer–Nadal rally, or the fantastic imagery of Hieronymus
Bosch, each person has a unique, only partly communicable
experience. I might add that the lack of translatability extends
to one’s research. People only see the ﬁnal draft—the real
show—they do not see the contradictory ideas and impulses
that lie hidden beneath.
In this essay, my focus will be on cognitive and behavioral
differences—differences in how people solve problems, make
predictions, and behave in strategic settings. Not personality.
Not identity. Those types of diversity will correlate with and
often cause the types of diversity I consider, but I will leave
them for others with greater expertise. My focus will be on
those dimensions that interest economists, political scientists,
and organizational theorists: differences in how people think
about problems. The research I describe differs from the
standard approaches taken by social psychologists in two
ways: I tend to rely on formal models, and I emphasize the
role of strategic incentives.
My desire to study diversity using models represents a slight
departure from the norm. Models rely on simpliﬁcations, so
as to elucidate the fundamental causal structures. Within
economics at least, a common assumption has been to rely
on representative agents—to assume that every person is
identical, to sweep all our differences under a giant rug. Repre-
sentative agent models have proven of great use, but they have
limits. And because of those limits, most models, even in macro
economics, now allow for some heterogeneity.
The value of embracing diversity and including it in one’s
models can be found in the work of Elinor and Vincent
Ostrom. They spent decades exploring empirically as well as
theoretically how heterogeneity—in beliefs, talents, endow-
ments, and preferences—inﬂuenced efforts to solve collective
action problems and common pool resource problems (Aligica,
2014; Ostrom, 2005). Collective action problems range in scope
from small villages managing water usage to the current global
effort to reduce carbon emissions. The Ostroms found that work-
able solutions require deep understandings of human differences
and how those differences facilitate and frustrate institutional
interventions. Without an understanding of human differences,
no institution, no Leviathan if you will, can prevent our lives
from being cold, brutish, and short.
Taking an even broader perspective, if one accepts that ﬁrst,
the modern world is both complex and growing more complex
at each moment, and second that individuals are limited in what
they can understand, then one is led rather quickly to the idea
that our continued success and perhaps even our survival depend
on our ability to leverage our differences (Axelrod & Cohen,
2001). Thus, heterogeneity—rather than seen as a nuisance that
creates variation and might even undo statistical signiﬁcance—
should be seen as of functional value to social systems.
The opportunity to describe these functional contributions
motivated my writing this essay. So often within the social
sciences, when the topic of diversity arises, discussions turn
to the many moral, political, and legal dimensions that arise
within a society as a result of identity diversity and, in particular,
the historical injustices that often occurred as a result of
those differences.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.My focus here will be orthogonal to those concerns, but is in
no way intended to diminish them. My interest will be in
showing how cognitive differences can improve the complex
systems in which we live by making them more innovative
and productive, by showing that diverse ways of seeing the
world can help predict outcomes of complex processes, and
that even though diversity can contribute to large events such
as market crashes and social uprisings, it (paradoxically) also
contributes to robustness by creating multiple routes of adap-
tion (Bednar, 2009; Frank, 1997).
At this point, I will take a moment to deﬁnewhat I mean by com-
plexity, which has literally scores of formal mathematical deﬁni-
tions (Mitchell, 2009; Page, 2010). A good stepping off point is
to distinguish between complexity and the complex systems that
produce it. Complex systems consist of diverse, networked
actors with adaptive interdependent behaviors (Miller & Page,
2007; Page, 2008a). Economies, ecosystems, the brain, and
middle schools can be classiﬁed as complex systems. In this
way, diversity and complexity go hand in hand (Page, 2010).
Without diversity, one cannot have much complexity. But
without complexity, diversity becomes mere variation, noise
about the mean. Within a complex system, diversity creates pat-
terns and helps drive transitions (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998).
Complex systems produce four classes of outcomes: equilib-
ria, simple patterns, randomness, and complexity (Wolfram,
2002). Wolfram deﬁnes complexity as lying between order,
such as the alternating sequence 101010101010 and random-
ness, such as might be produced by ﬂipping a coin. A complex
sequence lies between these two in that it has some patterns,
but the patterns are longer and not predictable. Others deﬁne
an outcome or process to be complex if it is difﬁcult to
describe, engineer, emerge, explain, or predict (see Page,
2010). For example, many deﬁne complexity as the minimal
description length, the number of words or symbols that are
needed to describe a process or an outcome. Deﬁnitions like
this require agreement on an alphabet, often just numbers.
The sequence 0000000 can be described in two numbers as
07, which means seven zeros. The sequence 1010101010
requires three. It is written as (10)5 or ﬁve 10s. The sequence
010010001 would require more than three numbers; hence, it
is more complex. This third sequence would also be harder
to engineer or explain, and it would require a more complex
system to produce from the bottom up; that is, it would seem
less likely to emerge.
These two deﬁnitions, between ordered and random, and difﬁ-
cult to explain, engineer, emerge, or predict, will be what I mean
when I say complex. Note that these deﬁnitions loosely align.
Something that is between ordered and random tends to be hard
to explain, engineer, or predict. What is perhaps equally impor-
tant to keep in mind is that complexity differs from chaos: ex-
treme sensitivity to initial conditions, complicated: lots of
interdependence but no adapting parts and therefore no surprise,
uncertain: environments with a random component, and difﬁ-
cult: problems that require many searches or steps to solve
(Page, 2008b). Some examples help to clarify the distinctions.
A double pendulum is chaotic, the roll of a die is uncertain, a
mechanical watch is complicated, and solving a crossword
puzzle is difﬁcult. None are complex.
Complexity science differs from more “normal” science by
focusing on multiple processes and the interdependenciesEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
3In economics, this sort of coordination occurs whenever each player chooses
the same equilibrium strategy in a game.
4Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures and Addresses Vol. 1.
5See my book Diversity and Complexity for a survey of diversity measures.
6This measure might be familiar to readers as Simpson’s Index, Hirﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index, the Effective Number of Parties, or the Effective Number
of Types.
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1998). Outcomes in complex systems are often, again by deﬁ-
nition, difﬁcult to predict. In mathematics, one plus one equals
two, but within a complex system, one plus one can equal three.
And sometimes, to extend Philip Anderson’s (1972) “more is
different” meme, the result of interactions can produce new
emergent phenomena, so one plus one equals penguin or even
penne arrabiata.
Given the mysterious aggregation properties of complex sys-
tems, a second goal in this essay will be to describe how con-
sidering multiple process simultaneously—these could be at
the individual or group level—can lead to different results than
if one considers them in isolation. To that end, I will describe a
model that combines two rather commonly assumed social
psychological motives—a desire for individual level consis-
tency and a drive for social conformity. Each of these forces
on its own produces homogeneity. Together they will produce
and maintain diversity. Before presenting that model, I will
begin by contextualizing that result in a broader discussion
of how people choose strategies, actions, and behaviors. I will
conclude the paper by describing in some detail two functional
properties of cognitive diversity: its potential contribution to
collective wisdom and its value in innovative problem solving.
Neither of these properties will surprise social psychologists,
but my methodological route to establishing them may. My
approach will also produce unexpected implications. It will
suggest that as our world becomes more complex—and by that
I mean less predictable, higher dimensional, and more
interdependent, the existence of collective cognitive diversity
will become even more important. Thus, understanding what
produces and maintains cognitive diversity takes on practical
importance as the challenges that we face—climate change,
poverty, and managing the world’s ﬁnancial system—become
more complex. To survive, we must do more than contain
multitudes, we must leverage them.
I recognize the implicit optimism inmy perspective. By focusing
on the diverse cognitive tools that people bring to bear on prob-
lems and situations, I am ignoring differences in personality
types, preferences, and identities. In any given group interaction,
all of these dimensions of diversity may be in play. Even if func-
tional cognitive diversity correlates with better outcomes, other
types of diversity may impede progress. Even more troubling,
separating out the distinct effects of each type of diversity may
be difﬁcult (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). These
caveats notwithstanding, controlled experiments do ﬁnd interac-
tions between functional diversity and performance (Pelled,
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Further, recent analyses that consider
enormous data sets involving academic papers, patents, and
collective problem solving demonstrate the beneﬁts of cognitive
diversity rather convincingly (Adamic et al., 2010; Schilling &
Green, 2011;Uzzi, Mukherjee, Stringer, & Jones, 2013), as does
decades of economic research on the performance of workers in
cities (Florida, 2002; Glaeser, 2010).
The remainder of this essay consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst
part, I describe how diversity might be produced and
maintained within complex systems. In the second part, I high-
light three functional contributions of diversity: more accurate
predictions, better solutions to hard problems, and greater
resilience. And ﬁnally, in a brief discussion at the end, I
describe some possible future research questions.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.THE PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF
DIVERSITYWhen studying human behavior, social scientists, be they
economists, sociologists, or psychologists, tend to focus on a
particular domain such as whether people take risks, vote,
cooperate, or act altruistically—perhaps allowing someone with
just a few items to cut ahead in the supermarket line. Within a
given domain, human behavior can be explained with a variety
of theories. Consider cooperative behavior. One can ﬁnd
evidence of intrinsic altruism (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), of
conformity (Asch, 1951; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976),
and of rational self-interest stemming from expected future interac-
tions (Myerson, 1997). In many situations, all three may operate.
In this section, I will consider a person interacting in multi-
ple domains. Thus, l will characterize an individual as a vector
of behaviors, with each variable corresponding to a behavior
in a speciﬁc context. This will enable me to discuss diversity
both within and across individuals. A population of individuals
can then be characterized as a collection of vectors, or bundles
if you will, of behaviors.
If we assign letters to behaviors (A = altruism, C = cooper-
ate, S = selﬁsh, etc.), then we can compare bundles from a
purely mathematical perspective. An individual’s bundle
might consist of all As or all Cs, the latter representing someone
who always acts cooperatively. A bundle could consist of a mix
of A’s, C’s, and S’s. This would represent someone who is
inconsistent or accepting of dissonance. We can think of each
of these behaviors being linked to contexts or domains. This en-
ables us to look at the population level and see whether people
have coordinated their behavior.3 In the models that I describe
here, my co-authors and I focus on strategic situations in which
individuals beneﬁt materially as well as psychologically from
coordinating. This construction includes only a small desire for
distinctiveness on the part of individuals (Brewer, 1991), a point
that I return to later after presenting our theoretical results.Aside: Measuring Diversity
Lord Kelvin famously said that when you cannot measure it,
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of
a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.4 Many (including me) ﬁnd
this an overstatement of the relative contribution of
quantitative science, but for the types of questions that I ask—
theoretical questions—quantitative measures are necessary to
derive results. Measures also facilitate the communication of
logical relationships as well. A claim that increases in connectivity
decrease diversity can be more effectively communicated if
both connectivity and diversity have formal deﬁnitions.
One can choose from a variety of diversity measures. These
range from the number of types to more complicated entropy-
based measures from information theory.5 Here, I will use the
diversity index.6 To construct the measure, assume that thereEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
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The assumption that types exist can be problematic. Boundaries
can be blurry—biologists argue at length over what
constitutes a species—or even arbitrary—philosophers
dispute whether types exist or are socially constructed. Those
caveats notwithstanding, we can often characterize people by
types (democratic, cooperator, voter, fan of the opera, or
punisher) with sufﬁciently high degrees of certainty to make
the distinction between types meaningful.
The diversity index equals the inverse of the probability that
two randomly chosen members of the population have the
same type.7 The measure is constructed so that if there exist
ﬁve equally likely types, the diversity index equals ﬁve.
If the types are not equally distributed, then the diversity
index will be less than the number of types. For example, a
recent survey showed that the colors of new cars sold in the
USA in 2012 were distributed as follows: white (22%), silver
(20%), black (19%), gray (12%), red (9%), beige/tan (8%),
blue (7%), green (2%), and all others (1%).8 If we count “all
others” as a type, then there exist 10 types. But because the
cars are not spread evenly across those 10 types, the diversity
index equals 6.2. So, even though cars come in 10 colors, it is
“as if” there were six colors of cars.
This index plays a prominent role in how scientists view the
health of systems. Here are just three examples. Economists use
the inverse of the diversity index to determine the competitive-
ness of a market. This measure provides a crude measure of
monopoly power. Up until relatively recently, the United States
Department of Justice horizontal merger guidelines set thresholds
for changes in the concentration index that trigger a presumption
of too much market power. Low diversity therefore implies
exploitation. Similarly, political scientists use the diversity index
as a measure of political competitiveness, where the parties repre-
sent types and the percentage of each party equals its vote
percentage. A lack of sufﬁcient diversity can be seen as a signal
of potential inefﬁciency. Thus, a democracy with a diversity
index near one may be a democracy in name but not in practice.
Third, ecosystems with less biodiversity are seen by many as
more fragile (Tilman, 1999).9The assumption that people attempt to use similar strategies across games
builds from theories in personality research and social psychology (e.g. cogni-
tive dissonance), suggesting that a person will prefer to act in a consistent fash-
ion. Evidence for dissonance reduction exists in many studies, although it isGameS Theory and Behavioral Ensembles
The ﬁrst behavioral diversity model that I describe considers
individuals who play multiple games at the same time with
different people. This model will provide a partial explana-
tion for why we see diversity across groups. I shall refer to
this model as the gameS theory model (Bednar & Page,
2007). To highlight the innovation in our approach, con-
sider by way of contrast, the canonical game experiment
run by economists, political scientists, or psychologists. A
population of people plays a game, such as the Prisoners’
Dilemma. Each person learns some strategy to play in that
game, and the experimenter measures outcomes, rates of
learning, and whether the population attains a Nash7If p1 is the probability that a person is of type, then the probability that two are
of type one equals p1 * p1. For explanatory purposes, I am assuming here that
the two members are chosen with replacement or that the population is inﬁnite.
For those that desire more formality, given the distribution across types (p1,
p2,… pn), the diversity index equals DI






Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.equilibrium—where each person’s strategy is optimal given
the strategies of the others.
In Bednar and Page (2007), we extend the standard setup to
allow for game ensembles. In our formulation, each person
either chooses or learns strategies to play in each of several
games. Importantly, rather than analyze each game in isola-
tion, we consider the potential for contextual effects in which
behavior in one game bleeds over into others.9
Our ﬁrst investigation used a mathematical game theoretic
model as well as an agent-based model. This second methodology
enabled us to experiment with multiple environments and contexts
and to nail down our core logical argument (Brown et al., 2005;
Miller & Page, 2007). In the original paper, we referred to our
approach as gameS theory to highlight our inclusions of
multiple games. The strategies that individuals choose in these
multiple games were called behavioral repertoires.
To give this discussion more formal structure, consider how
an individual might construct her repertoire. She could treat
each game within the ensemble in isolation and either select
or evolve an optimal strategy for that game. That assumption
would allow for an individual to use radically different strate-
gies in different games. Alternatively, she could choose
general purpose strategies that apply across multiple games,
or she might choose distinct but similar strategies that balance
increases in cognitive costs with reductions in payoffs.
In our initial paper (Bednar & Page, 2007), we relied on a
representation of strategies called a Moore Machine in which
strategies consist of states and transitions between those
states. We let the number of states serve as a proxy for cogni-
tive costs.10 The model produced substantial ensemble effects
on behavior. We found that behavior in a particular game often
depended on the other games in the ensemble.
Taken at face value, these ﬁndings provide a more bottom-
up explanation for empirical evidence of behavioral differences
in similar games across different cultures (Henrich et al., 2001).
Those studies highlight correlation between levels of coopera-
tion and equal sharing with the extent of market concentration
and cooperative types of economic activities. The gameS
theory model suggests an alternative causal chain to explain that
regularity: market institutions induce equal splitting behaviors
(game theorists will be quick to note that equal splitting is
the Nash equilibrium of a bargaining game), and cooperative
games should similarly induce cooperative behaviors. Confronted
with novel situations, individuals invoke familiar behavioral
routines, that is, cooperation or equal splitting.
A deeper question, one that lies in the intersection of cogni-
tive psychology and social psychology, is the extent to which
so-called human cognitive biases might be contingent on cul-
ture and even be partly a product of the informational and stra-
tegic situations within which people interact. Answering thatnot as strong as many believe (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Festinger, 1957;
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002; Ross & Ward
1995). Evidence from the political realm shows that an individual may ignore
the opinions of experts that do not align with his or her world view (Darmofal,
2005).
10Samuelson (2001) used a similar approach in considering allocation of cog-
nitive effort across two games.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
Figure 1. Examples of games in ensembles
12We see this phenomenon as distinct from the sort of uncertainty reduction
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studies. Here, I am not attempting to make an empirical point
but instead emphasizing the logic of our model, which is
builds from the ideas of (Gigerenzer, 2000). We assume that
people develop behaviors in response to their environment
and that for the most part, those behaviors function adequately
if not nearly optimally. Yet, at times, because the behaviors are
rule based, they will fail to be optimal. And, therefore, they
can appear to be biases.
This idea that psychology needs to branch out and consider
more diverse populations before characterizing a behavior as a
human bias is not our own. It ﬁnds much fuller voice in an
article by Medin, Bennis, and Chandler (2010) who argued
for the broadening of subject pools.11 Pushing that line of
argument even further, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan
(2010) characterized the Americans who have provided
subject pools for many of the studies on cognitive biases as
the “weirdest people in the world.” To reiterate, we believe
that “weirdness” in a given setting may be partly a function
of the other domains within which one ﬁnds oneself. In other
words, Americans may be weird in the lab because of the lives
we live outside of it.
The theoretical papers that I have discussed rely on mathe-
matics and simulations. The speciﬁc learning models assumed
rather primitive behavior such as best response rules and
replicator dynamics. We therefore felt obliged to study those
same contexts experimentally. Together with Yan Chen and
Tracy Liu, Jenna Bednar, and I took the same basic framework
to the laboratory (Bednar, Chen, Liu, & Page, 2012). There,
we found that individuals often played common strategies
across games even if those strategies may not be optimal in
both games. Consider the three games shown in Figure 1.
The ﬁrst is the familiar Prisoners’ Dilemma; the second, a
game we call Strong Alternation, as individuals do best by
alternating who gets the better prize; and the third, a game
we call Weak Alternation. Notice that in Weak Alternation,
alternating in the off diagonal boxes gives a higher payoff than
playing in the upper left but only by a small amount.
In the experiments, individuals played two games, each
with a different player. We found strong empirical evidence
for behavioral spillovers in these games. How people played
in one game was not independent of what other games they
were playing. Perhaps more striking than the more general
result were the ﬁndings from particular games. For example,11See also Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, and Suzuki (2004).
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.when individuals played two Weak Alternation games, or
when they played one Weak Alternation game and one Strong
Alternation game, they were twice as likely to alternate
between the off diagonal corners (the optimal strategy was
played in each case approximately 36% of the time) than when
they played Weak Alternation with the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game, where they alternated only 18% of the time. In other
words, if you are alternating in one context, you are twice as
likely to alternate in another.
To summarize the experimental results, the behaviors that
emerge, and I use that word purposefully as we believe them
to be more the emergent result of a social process than ratio-
nally chosen by the individual subjects, depend on the games
within the ensemble. Independent and related multi game ex-
periments by others support that intuition: namely that people
appear to juggle many strategies in their heads and that what
strategy comes to dominate in one game can be inﬂuenced
by the strategies used in other games (Cason, Savikhin, &
Sheremeta, 2012). Thus, ensemble effects may contribute to
an understanding of the behavioral diversity that we see across
populations.
As a follow up, we have begun to explore whether behavior
depends on the order in which games were added to an ensemble.
This question is of interest to people who study institutions
because evidence from natural experiments shows that early
institutions can have a large effect on future behavioral
patterns as does research on founder effects in organizational
behavior and even regional behavior. Dell (2010), for instance,
found that the former presence of mita, a form of forced labor
arrangements in mines, within a region persists today. In
modern day Peru, regions that had mita exhibit less equality
and provide fewer public goods. This is an example of
behavioral path dependence—where previous games inﬂuence
current outcomes (Page, 2006).
In one preliminary experiment, we have found that individuals
who learned to alternate in the Weak Alternation game
tended to sustain that alternation when playing a Prisoners’
Dilemma game even though they were playing the Prisoners’
Dilemma game with a different player.12 An informal survey
of experimental economists revealed that they had rarely if ever
seen individuals alternate in the Prisoners’ Dilemma when that
game is played in isolation except for brief periods.motivation identiﬁed by Sherif and Harvey (1952) and having more to do with
learning transfer.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
14As an example, in one set of numerical simulations, with 100 individuals, 10
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In both our theoretical and experimental research, we were
surprised by the level of diversity within populations. This
piqued our interest. Even if we ran our computer models for
thousands of iterations, the populations often did not fully
coordinate as predicted by the mathematical model. In the
experiments, when playing multiple games, unless the game
had what game theorists call a dominant strategy efﬁcient
equilibrium (in layman’s terms—a totally obvious best
choice), the population kept churning. Individuals kept
switching their actions. Here was an example of where more
was different. That difference merited further study.13
We had constructed the model to explore diversity across
populations, and it was producing diversity within populations
as well. Jenna Bednar deserves credit for the key observation.
She noticed that the gameS theory framework created dual
incentives—a drive towards consistency at the individual level
in the form of consistent strategies across the games in the
ensemble—and a drive toward as coordination at the population
level in the form of equilibrium behavior. These incentives
do not necessarily compete—individuals could coordinate
on a common, consistent set of behaviors.
To explore why the model did not converge, we
constructed a simpliﬁed version of the game ensemble model
that assumes the two forces: one socially oriented that we refer
to as conformity and one self-oriented that we call consistency
(Bednar, Bramson, Jones-Rooy, & Page, 2010). In the starkest
version of the model, behavior in a given context takes a value
of either zero or one. For example, zero might represent selﬁsh
behavior, and one might represent cooperative behavior.
We initialize the model by randomly assigning each
individual random strings of zeros and ones to represent his
or her behavior. One person therefore might be represented
by 1011110 and another by 0111010. We then apply the
self-oriented and social-oriented psychological processes. We
capture social conformity as follows: we randomly choose
two people and an attribute. If the two people have the same
value on the attribute, nothing happens. If they disagree on that
attribute, one of the two people switches its attribute to match
that of the other. To make the model more realistic, we assume
a small probability of randomly choosing an attribute’s value
(less than a 1% chance). In this way, some interactions will
produce two people with different attribute values. This
randomness can be thought of as error, experimentation, or
even the mildest desire for distinctiveness.
Our assumption of such a large probability of conforming
requires an explanation. In the model, individuals have many
attributes and switch at most one attribute. We could lower
the probability of coordinating or becoming consistent, but
that would only slow the process. It would not alter the results.
Second, our interest was for games in which people have strong
incentives to coordinate. When I meet a friend, I have strong in-
centives to greet him or her in the same way he or she greets me
—lest when I put I my hand to shake, I poke out his or her eye
when he or she begins her bow. I also have strong incentives
to drive on the same side of the road as everyone else or to go13We measured strategic churning using an entropy measure over outcomes.
We found high levels of entropy over outcomes in the multiple game experi-
ments, which imply that outcomes did not converge.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the same party as my friends. I am less likely to switch my opin-
ions on gun control or abortion. Other choices, such as what
clothes I choose to wear, what books I read, and what music I
listen to lie between these two extremes.
One need not break out the mathematics to know what hap-
pens in a model with only social conformity operating. After a
relatively short period, for any given attribute, most individ-
uals converge on the same value. Across attributes, however,
the values will differ. For example, a particular run of the
model might produce a population in which almost everyone
can be represented by the string 1011101. The percentage of
people who do not take the more common value on an attri-
bute increases linearly with the amount of randomness. There-
fore, such a model does not produce much diversity across a
society, but it does produce diversity within each individual.
To capture the desire for consistency, we randomly choose
an individual and randomly select two of that individual’s
attributes. If those two attributes have the same value, he or
she does nothing. If they disagree, then he or she changes one
to match the other. As before, we also assume a small amount
of randomness. If only consistency operates, then the process
will be similar to the conformity process with the number of
attributes playing the role of the number of individuals. The result
will be that each individual tends to assign the same value to each
attribute but that people differ in which attribute; for example,
one person might be 0000000, whereas another will be 111111,
with the caveat that the noise will cause slight deviations.
To summarize, the conformity model works at the social level.
It produces homogeneity across individuals. The consistency
model operates at the individual level. It produces homogeneity
within individuals. When one turns on both processes, one would
expect homogeneity at both levels: consistent people who are all
consistent in the same way. After all, neither process promotes
diversity. One creates individual level consistency. The other
produces social conformity.
Yet, when we turn on both conformity and consistency, the
model does not produce homogeneity. Instead, it produces
diversity. We have two well-established forces in play—an
individual desire for consistency and a social desire for confor-
mity. Each produces homogeneity but at different levels. Yet,
when you construct a society with both forces in operation,
you ﬁnd that small errors magnify to such an extent that you
do not get homogeneity at the population level. You get
diversity. Why?14
The answer lies in the interaction between the processes.
Diversity persists because random ﬂuctuations propagate in
two directions. First, ﬂuctuations spread across the population
as one person copies another. Second, they spread within a
person as the inner drive for consistency can cause a behavior
in one context to be applied in another. Once applied in that
new context, that behavior could be applied by someone else
and spread.
Here is an example of how that could happen. In Kuala
Lumpur, many people ride motorbikes to work. Some people
wear helmets. Some younger males wear baseball hats, andattributes, and 6 possible attribute values, we found the diversity index to equal
to approximately three. The most it can be is six, and if people had coordi-
nated, it would equal to one. See Page, Sander, and Schneider-Mizell (2007)
for a mathematical analysis of convergence.
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air. That behavior is no different than in many other cities. Let
us label that behavior wear clothing backward on motorbike.
That might not seem like a behavior that would spread to
another domain, yet it has.15 Kuala Lumpur has a humid tropi-
cal climate and moderate to substantial pollution. To protect
their clothes and to avoid overheating, many people wear thin
jackets backwards when riding their motorbikes. This func-
tional adaptation protects their clothing from the dirty air and
occasional splash but at the same time keeps them cool. Does
it look silly to wear a coat backwards? Yes. But once everyone
is doing it, it becomes acceptable. The social acceptance is
beneﬁcial as well given the functionality of the behavior.
The type of disconnect our model produces, where the
macro level result (diversity) does not neatly line up with the
micro level forces, is endemic to complex systems, an idea
highlighted in Thomas Schelling’s Micromotives and
Macrobehaviors. Although individuals seek to be internally
consistent and to conform, small errors accumulate in such a
way to prevent them from accomplishing either. This paradox
of aggregation suggests the value from considering how social
psychological processes aggregate.
In the model that I have described, all behaviors are equally
linked. More nuanced models might consider either clusters of
behaviors based on context (work, family, social, etc.) or
might place a network structure on the behaviors themselves.
In other words, not all behaviors might share a link. One might
even construct an inﬂuence parameter that captures how much
one behavior is inﬂuenced by another. In such a model, one
would expect clustered, linked, or close behaviors to converge
to similar or identical values and those that are far apart not to
do so. Such a model would be worth exploring and would
almost certainly generate even greater intra-individual diversity.
Let me return now to Brewer’s (1991) research on optimal
distinctiveness. In trying to achieve distinctiveness, people
might have to put forth great effort to differentiate themselves
within communities that exert tremendous pressures to conform.
Or people could ﬁnd that it is relatively easy to be distinct, that
even a tiny amount of experimentation maintains a level of
personal heterogeneity necessary for a feeling of self-worth.
Our ﬁndings suggest that achieving distinctiveness may be
relatively easy. Coordinating may be the difﬁcult part.Ecologies of Mental Models
The coordination consistency model provides one approach
for demonstrating how micro level interactions produce macro
level diversity. An alternative approach borrows ideas and
techniques from population genetics. The idea here is to think
of an ecology of mental models. What do I mean by that? I
mean that each person has a mental model that they carry around
in their head. A person’s mental model may change over time
because of interactions with the mental models of others. As a
modeling conceit, you can think of each type of mental model
as you might a species in an ecology. Just as a savannah might
contain lions and elephants, so might a cocktail party contain
donkeys (democrats) and elephants (republicans).15I have no evidence that it spreads from hats to coats. I am speculating.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The reason for adopting the ecological metaphor is that one
can use tools from population genetics to solve for population
level diversity as a function of the features of the world that
matter to social scientists, namely, the structure of social inter-
actions, the rates at which people copy from one another, the
number of possible types, and the population size. Thus, it is
at least possible that models from ecology may help us under-
stand levels of cognitive or behavioral diversity in the social
world just as they help ecologists to make sense of species
diversity. This is what is meant by transdisciplinary: a single
model applies to disparate disciplines.
Along with Evan Economo, Lu Hong and I, we have shown
how an extension of the standard population genetics model
can also produce a diversity carrying capacity, a total amount
of maintainable diversity within a social systems (Economo,
Hong, & Page, 2012). Imagine a population of individuals
each of whom has a type. As indicated earlier, these types
could be anything—behaviors, mental models, preferences,
or problem-solving approaches. They could even correspond
to how you wear your jacket on your motorbike. Assume that
initially, these types are random. In subsequent periods, at
some rate, individuals will update their types in one of two
ways. They can copy the type of someone else. Or, they can
randomly choose a new type. So, like in the previous model,
there exists conformity and experimentation.
In population genetics models, the level of diversity in the
population is considered as an aggregate statistic in a dynami-
cal system. I will do my best here to make some rather cum-
bersome mathematics intuitive. Recall that to measure
diversity, we need only to keep track of the probability that
two randomly chosen individuals “match”, that is, have the
same type (the diversity index equals the inverse of the proba-
bility of matching). One uses a mathematical equation to keep
track of how the probability of matching changes over time. At
an equilibrium, the probability of matching—and therefore the
diversity index—attains a speciﬁc value. People continue
changing their types, but the probability that two randomly
chosen people match types reaches an equilibrium. Thus, the
equilibrium is stochastic, not static.16
The equation that captures how diversity change over time
builds from two observations.
Observation 1: If either of the two individuals experiments,
the probability that they have the same type equals the
probability of two randomly chosen types matching.
Observation 2: If both individuals copy someone from the
population, they can either copy the same person in which
case they will have the same type, or they can copy different
people and the probability they have the same type will be
the same as that for the entire population.
Notice that using this framework, the number of types and
the population size act as constraints. The relative propensities
to copy and experiment describe how the social process un-
folds. I will be the ﬁrst to admit that the model that I have
described so far is too stark to capture a real social process.
It oversimpliﬁes how ideas and behaviors spread and leaves
out social structure entirely. This model is not the end of a
research agenda. It is an opening. In Economo et al. (2012),16See Economo et al. (2012) for the full version.
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structure and show how social structure inﬂuences diversity.
Using amore general model, we can show that breaking a pop-
ulation into non-interacting subgroups does not produce a very
large increase in diversity because each subgroup has a
substantially lower diversity carrying capacity. Thus, whereas a
group of 400 might maintain 40 types, two groups of 200 might
each only be able to maintain 25 types, and their type overlap
might be sufﬁcient that overall diversity does not increase.17
The larger point, the one that I hope does not get lost in the
minutia of these models, is that in a social system, multiple
social psychological processes occur contemporaneously.
These can include efforts to be individually consistent, to be
unique or interesting, or to conform with a group. Collectively,
these processes produce a distribution, a diversity, of behaviors,
beliefs, ideas, and even skill sets. That diversity, as I show next,
has functional value. Therefore, it is worth contemplating
whether these process overproduce or underproduce diversity,
a thought I return to in the discussion at the end of the essay.THE FUNCTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
DIVERSITYThe previous models have provided an overview of some tech-
niques for understanding how much diversity we might expect
to see in a population and how it depends on constraints and
processes. In this section, I will brieﬂy describe some models
that explain why cognitive diversity plays such an important
role, particularly in a society that confronts complex problems.
I will do so in the context of two tasks: prediction and problem
solving.18 I will then make some brief comments on the rela-
tionship between diversity and resilience.
Prediction
On a predictive task, collections of individuals often prove
more accurate than individuals, a phenomenon popularized
in the book the Wisdom of Crowds (Surowiecki, 2005). The
relationship between diversity of predictions and collective
accuracy can be stated using mathematics based on expected
errors using what I call the Diversity Prediction Theorem.19
The theorem, a mathematical identity, can be written as follows:
Crowd’sError ¼ MeanIndividualError  PredictiveDiversity
In this equation, the crowd’s error equals distance (the
squared difference) between the crowd’s prediction and the
truth.20 The mean error of individuals equals the average dis-
tance of each person in the crowd from the truth. The predictive
diversity equals the average distance from the individual17One can explore these same sorts of questions empirically by looking at the
heuristics that individuals use to choose their type. This requires good data and
the ability to characterize heuristics formally. For one remarkable application
in the context of scientiﬁc research, see Evans and Foster (2011) who analyzed
the heuristics that scientists use to decide on which molecules to study.
18See Page (2007) for a more elaborate presentation of these models.
19See Page (2007), Armstrong (2001), and Batchelor and Dua (1995) for more
complete treatments.
20Statisticians square errors to punish larger errors more and because if you
summed signed errors negative and positive errors would cancel one another
out.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.predictions to the average prediction. Formally, this is the
variance in the predictions, but I use the word diversity to
highlight that this is the realized differences in their predictions.
The equation tells us that wise crowds, that is, crowds with
small errors, rely as much on collective diversity as they
depend on individual accuracy. Why? Consider a crowd of
two people predicting annual snowfall (in inches) in Buffalo.
Assume each has a squared error equal to nine, that is, each
misses the true amount by 3 inches. If both predict 3 inches.
too many or 3 inches too few, that is, if they exhibit no diversity,
then the crowd’s prediction equals their common individual
prediction, and the crowd also has an error of nine. (The theorem
can be written as 9=9–0.) If instead, one predicts 3 in. too much
and the other predicts 3 in. too few, then the crowd will be
exactly correct. The errors cancel because of the diversity of
the predictions. (The theorem can be written as 0=9–9).
The point of introducing this theorem is to lay a foundation
for deeper questions about the nature of the predictions them-
selves. I have been particularly interested in how to think
about the statistical properties of the predictions. In the formal
literature, there exist two distinct strands. Lu Hong and I refer
to these as the generated and interpreted frameworks (Hong &
Page, 2009). In the generated framework, predictions are
modeled as the truth plus a disturbance. Imagine that people
are predicting the height of a tree. Each might have a slightly
different vantage point. Each can then be thought of as seeing
the true height plus some error term. If those error terms are
independent, then they will be diverse, and the crowd error
will be small. In this framework, diversity comes from error
or noise from an external source. In this framework, crowds
do better because the individual random errors cancel.
The incredible success of statisticians in predicting recent
electoral outcomes relies on the generated framework logic.
Each poll represents a signal of the truth plus some error. By
averaging across many polls, those errors cancel. Of course,
if the statistician possesses more information about the accu-
racy and the biases of those polls, he or she can use weighting
procedures in which more accurate and more diverse predic-
tions get greater weight that perform even better (Lamberson
& Page, 2011; Silver, 2012).
This notion of predictions as the truth plus an error term
makes for a tractable model but has limited empirical plausi-
bility in many contexts and equates diversity with noise. It
does not connect to the previous models in which a population
of people have diverse ideas or models that they carry around
in their head. Fortunately, this way of thinking about predic-
tions—as coming from models in our heads, can be captured
by the interpretive signal framework.
In the interpretive framework, people use different models
and therefore make different mistakes. Psychologists differ in
how they conceptualize these mental models. Johnson-Laird
(2009) relied on a truth table framework. My own attempts
to construct models of predictive models borrow more from
Smith and Medin (1981) who think in terms of predictions
based on categories. In this approach, an individual assigns
events to categories and then constructs causal or correlative
frameworks between those categories. Thus, people who have
had different life experiences, come from different cultural
groups, or have different formal training may well construct
different categories and rely on different models to make theirEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
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could construct different truth tables based on different experiences
or inﬂuences. In either case, one can think of the diverse
models as being produced at least partly by the kinds of social
processes that I described in the previous section.
The diversity in categorizations that underpins interpreta-
tive signals has been the focus of substantial research in
several ﬁelds. Social psychologists have identiﬁed differences
in how people categorize the world, including how we
categorize others (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). Cogni-
tive anthropologists have developed a number of techniques to
characterize the homogeneity, or what they call the consensus,
within a culture (Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). These
include pile sorts, in which individuals are asked to place objects
or events in piles based on similarity. These categorization tasks
test to see if individuals make sense of the world in the same
way. In a parallel research agenda, brain scientists have been
studying how people classify entities by their features
(see Shafto, Kemp, Mansignhka, Gordon, & Tenenbaum, 2006).
Notice that the logic for how interpretative signals aggre-
gate provides more nuance. If people use different categories
and therefore construct different models, they can collectively
make accurate predictions not because their errors cancel—the
logic from the generated framework—but because they are ﬁl-
tering the world differently and therefore each seeing different
approximations.
Holding accuracy ﬁxed, more diverse predictions produce
more accurate crowds (Ashton, 1986). True, as in the gener-
ated case, the errors are canceling out, but the reason they
cancel out is not because the predictions are statistically inde-
pendent draws from some external source. They are different
because the people rely on distinct models.21
Let us now link the logic of the Diversity Prediction
Theorem using the interpretive framework to the social process
model. It is not difﬁcult to rewrite a version of the diversity pre-
diction theorem using the diversity index (Economo et al.,
2012). Thus, the diversity index together with average individ-
ual accuracy can be a proxy for crowd accuracy. A social pro-
cess that produces more diversity in how people think will
result in more accurate collective prediction—provided of
course that those additional models are not too much less accu-
rate. What this tells us is that we would like for social processes
to drive out the bad models—as their reduction in accuracy
probably outweighs whatever advantages they provide in terms
of diversity—but to keep the models that are diverse but rela-
tively high accuracy.
The value of these diverse models becomes more important
as the world becomes more complex, that is, harder to predict.
The logic goes as follows: we would like the crowd error
to be small. However, the environment is complex, that
is, hard to predict. Any individual model is likely to pro-
duce a large error. Now, invoke the Diversity Prediction
Theorem. It says, crowd error equals average error minus
diversity. If average error is large (because of the complexity
of the world), the only way that the crowd error can be small
is if the diversity is large. Therefore, diversity is necessary in
the face of complexity.21Of course, for both interpreted and generated signal structures, one can do
better than simple averaging—a subject of much attention within the ensemble
learning community (Breiman, 1996)
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.This intuition can be made more formal by thinking in
terms of the number of relevant variables and interdepen-
dencies. Suppose that we are predicting outcomes in a system
that has only eight relevant variables. This might be a task like
predicting the number of pounds of bananas or boxes of crackers
sold during a givenmonth by a large grocery store. Assuming suf-
ﬁcient data, one can probably construct a model that is highly ac-
curate. There may not be much room for improvement on the best
models and, as a result, at most a small beneﬁt from diversity.
Next, suppose that we are predicting the result of a much
more complex process—perhaps the weather next weekend
or the price of a stock 2 years from now. This may be difﬁcult
for any one person or model to get right because the system
contains many interacting parts that can be categorized in nu-
merous ways. In other words, there will exist many possible
models. In such cases, aggregating diverse models will be
more likely to add substantial value. And in fact, in weather
forecasting, human forecasters, although less accurate, can
improve on computer predictions owing to humans looking
at the data differently (Silver, 2012). A similar phenomenon
occurred in the Netﬂix Prize competition in which teams com-
peted for a million dollars to predict movie preferences. Here
as well, aggregates of models far outperformed the best
individual model (Bell & Koren, 2007).
Even with diverse models, we have no guarantee of being
able to predict the future, especially not in the modern com-
plex world Tetlock (2005). Complex systems, by deﬁnition,
are difﬁcult to predict. This does not mean that they are
random. Whatever did happen will be logically consistent,
which will compel us to seek better theories and models
(Watts, 2011). Complex systems, because they contain
interdependent parts, can also produce large events (Taleb,
2007). Often, these large events are hard to predict. Almost
no one predicted the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc (Kalyvas,
1999), the Arab spring (Lamberson & Page, 2012), or the
ﬁnancial market collapse. The latter case may be partly delu-
sional; no one wants the bubble to be a bubble (Reinhart &
Rogoff, 2009). Nevertheless, the bubble did exist, and we all
suffered. Greater diversity in the ideas that people carry around
in their heads would not necessarily reduce the number and extent
of such events, but it should lead to less collective surprise and
therefore better preparation for the consequences.
Problem Solving
I next turn to problem solving and the role that diversity of
cognitive tools plays in ﬁnding better solutions to problems.
A substantial part of the modern economy consists of people
who solve problems for a living (Autor, Katz, & Kearney,
2006; Wolff, 2006). In problem solving, the value added of
an individual is contextual. It depends on the tools the person
brings as well as the tools of the other people working on
the problem.
The tool framework problematizes the notion of individual
ability. To understand why the concept of ability may have
less purchase when people solve problems rather than drive
spikes, consider an economy in which people engage primarily
in physical labor. The ability of an individual might represent
how many table legs he or she can make in a day. Assuming
no crowding effects, the total number of table legs made byEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
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In that world, production is additive. The best team consists of
the best individuals. The same would be true if people were
laying rails or applying rivets. In each of these cases, if I
wanted to build the best possible team of 10 members, I would
hire the 10 individuals of highest ability—the ones who could
produce the most table legs.
This additive logic does not hold for problem solving,
which is why diversity becomes important. Suppose that I
use IQ as proxy for ability and I hire people based solely on
IQ. Generally, that would not give the best team because team
problem-solving ability is not additive in the abilities of the team
members (Hong & Page, 2001). Evidence using IQ test scores
from British schoolchildren on the Raven’s Progressive Matrix
test shows that someone’s contribution to group may depend
on the others in the group. In other words, given two people with
the same IQ, one may be more likely to get problems right that
other people in the group tend to get wrong (Bachrach, Graepel,
Kasneci, Kosinski, & Van Gael, 2012). Another study shows
that a team may have something like an IQ and that a team’s
IQ does not correlate strongly with the IQs of its members
(Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010).
How then does one think about team performance on prob-
lem solving tasks? Lu Hong and I (Hong & Page, 2001, 2004)
constructed a model based on what we call perspectives and
heuristics. A perspective is a representation of a problem, a
mapping of the set of all possible solutions. Suppose that indi-
viduals are tasked with ﬁnding a minimal route that visits 10
cites, a traveling salesperson problem. One perspective would
be to write the cities in a list according to the order that they
will be visited. Another perspective would be to list the cities
alphabetically but assign a number to each one depending on
where it is in the order. A third perspective would be to draw
the cities on a map with the route represented by lines.
Heuristics are the tricks, tools, and techniques that an indi-
vidual uses to locate new solutions within his or her perspec-
tive. Heuristics for the ﬁrst perspective would include
ﬂipping adjacent cities, ﬂipping random cities, and ﬂipping
cities separated by a single city.
In our model, individuals can differ in both their perspectives
and their heuristics. In this framework, a person’s ability equals
how well he or she performs on the problem on his or her own.
The ability of a group of people equals how well they do collec-
tively. As mentioned earlier, ability is not additive. The ability of
the group does not equal the sum of the abilities of the individuals.
More germane to the present argument, it is also true, under some
rather mild assumptions, that diversity often trumps ability, by
that I mean that choosing team members based on diversity of
perspectives and heuristics will lead to better outcomes than
choosing team members based on ability (Hong & Page, 2004).
Diversity trumps ability because the best problem solvers
often tend to be similar: if you choose the two best problem
solvers from a large set, then they are likely to use similar per-
spectives and heuristics. As a result, their two heads will not be
much better than one. In contrast, if two people rely on diverse
perspectives, then a solution that appears natural to one problem
solver may be innovate to another. I should emphasize that
these results are theoretical, not experimental or empirical.
That said, empirical analyses covering tens of thousands of
cases from disparate domains align with the intuition producedCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.by the model. Studies of online problem-solving sites involving
hundreds of thousands of problem solvers show that writing
questions to attract more diverse problem solvers leads to higher
probabilities of correct solutions (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010;
Lakhani & Jeppesen, 2007). Studies of high impact papers in
the academy show the value of citing diverse sources (Schilling
& Green, 2011) and even the value of having co-authors
from different institutions (Jones, Wuchty, & Uzzi, 2008).
Studies of patents show that the proximity of researchers results
in fewer citations (Shi, Adamic, Tseng, & Gavin, 2009). Finally,
as mentioned in the introduction, individuals in larger cities have
long been known to be more productive. Many explain this as
partly being due to exposure to more ideas, to cities maintaining
more diversity (Glaeser, 2010).
These ﬁndings contrast with the literally hundreds of studies
of small teams and groups that show little effect of diversity on
average that I mentioned in the introduction. Further, meta-
analyses of the experimental studies demonstrate that one
cannot separate the sorts of functional diversity from other
types of diversity such as identity diversity and personality
type diversity (see van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). This
conﬂation of concepts muddles empirical tests of any one
effect. Also, even though there exist many studies, the sample
size within each one is small. By way of comparison, the
aforementioned research on patents and academic papers
covers tens of thousands of cases, and the research on cities
implicitly includes millions of people. Overall then, the data
supporting the value of cognitive diversity are, by the usual
standards of evidence, quite strong for small groups and
exceptionally strong for the large populations of scientists.
Resilience
Last, I will brieﬂy describe the theoretical link between diver-
sity and resilience. Among the ﬁrst to make this connections
was Ashby, who helped to develop the ﬁeld of cybernetics.
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1956) states that
for every disturbance, there must exist a response. Thus, if a
society consists of people with diverse sets of skills, they are
more likely to withstand some external disturbance. The logic
is rather obvious: more tools imply more responses. Ashby’s
logic can be extended by allowing for recombination of
responses. If responses can be combined say by attaching a
saw to an electric motor or a chain to a bicycle, then the
number of types of responses explodes combinatorically. This
of course ignores any cost of maintaining that diversity.
The second, and more subtle link, between diversity and
resilience relies on the Price Equation and what biologists call
Fisher’s Fundamental Law (Frank, 1997). This states that the rate
of adaptation correlates with the degree of diversity. The mathe-
matics of the Price Equation is a bit involved (see Page, 2010),
but the logic is easy to grasp. Represent a problem as a mountain
with a single peak, something like Mt. Fuji. Now, imagine that
the value or utility of a solution equals the height of it’s location
on the mountain, so the best solution is at the peak.
Imagine ﬁrst that there exists no diversity, and that every-
one has found the optimal solution: everyone is standing on
the peak. Suppose that there is a shifting of the plates of the
earth and what was a peak is now the side of a larger mountain.
In a biological system, if there was no diversity, there wouldEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 267–279 (2014)
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maintained, so that some members of the population were
not at the peak, then after the plate shift, some of them would
now be on higher ground. Their DNA could lead the way to
the higher peak. This is the logic of the Price Equation and
Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem: diversity is a form of exploration.
Exploration produces resilience to change. Here again, we
see an important difference between complex systems and
equilibrium systems. In equilibrium system, you should stay
at the peak. Diversity is variance. In a complex system that
constantly shifts and adapts, diversity enables the population
to move from poor locations to better ones. Hence, more
diversity implies more robustness.DISCUSSIONIn this article, I have described how theoretical analyses of collec-
tive predictions, problem solving, and resilience to change all
demonstrate the value of cognitive diversity and how models of
dynamic social processes provide some ideas about how that
diversitymight arise and bemaintained. In particular, models with
multiple processes seem capable of maintaining perhaps even
more diversity. These ﬁndings suggest a possible value in consid-
ering multiple social psychological processes simultaneously.
The models I described can provide insights into how pro-
cesses can maintain diversity within and across populations,
but such models cannot tell us about the relative contributions
to cognitive difference that result from identity, culture,
experience, education, etc. Some differences or predisposi-
tions may be partly innate. Many may be due to context and
social psychological inﬂuences. And probably, all are
inﬂuenced in ways big and small by the interactions between
who we are and who we are with. These questions can be seen
as reformulations of the age old agency versus structure dis-
cussion. But that does not make them any less important.
In that my interests have been primarily whether societies
produce too little or too much cognitive diversity (Hong
et al., 2012), I have been drawn toward research in social
psychology. Several of the social and individual level inﬂuences
that lie at the core of the discipline, conformity, coordination, and
dissonance reduction, all work to reduce diversity, as does
emulating those who appear to be performing best.
Does this damping down lead to too little diversity? Being
trained as an economist I cannot help but ask such questions.
The optimal level, if such a thing exists, surely depends on
context. We do not necessarily want a lot of diversity when
people choose which side of the road on which to drive. Nor
do we want diversity when people work as part of a coordi-
nated team on a routine task. This logic underpins the enor-
mous success of scientiﬁc management techniques, six
sigma, and checklist procedures (Gawande, 2009; Tennant,
2001). These all work to reduce diversity—to do a job the
same way, the right way, every time. And within a
manufacturing process, that may be ﬁne. But within a political
or social system, diversity reduction to that extent would be
dangerous (Le Bon, 1895).
When we look out at the world, we do not see pure confor-
mity because individuals recognize and celebrate the value ofCopyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.thinking differently. We take delight and even pride in being
unique. These interests push back against the force of confor-
mity (Becker et al., 2012). The balance between the desire to
be different and the appeal of conforming produces the mangle
of difference and sameness that we see in the world. But again,
this in no way guarantees that the level of diversity produced
necessarily aligns with what is desired.
To my knowledge, there exists no invisible hand argument
that diversity necessarily equilibrates as some ideal level. One
might argue that in complex environments, we need more
diversity. Hence, business strategists often invoke the phrase
“innovate or die” or advocate “quick and nimble” corporate
cultures to borrow the title of a recent book (Bryant, 2014).
Many social observers also feel that the collapse of distinct
cultures may lead to less robustness. Ecologists have similar
concerns—thus the transdisciplinary nature of many of the
questions that link diversity to complexity.
That is not to say that more diversity is necessarily better.
Perhaps, we need less diversity. Is not diversity one cause of
complexity? Certainly, it is. And this suggests that there may
well be a sweet spot, or at least a preferred region. And given
the substantial functional contributions from cognitive diver-
sity, questions of how much and what types of diversity would
create a more robust, innovative, and fair society merit deeper
thinking, and especially thinking by social psychologists. Why
do people choose to learn what they learn? Why do people think
about problems in particular ways? What social psychological
processes drive the creation and spread of diverse perspectives,
categories, analogies, mental models, and heuristics? All ques-
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